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INTRODUCTION 
Chase's Respondent's Brief attempts to make this appeal more complicated than it is. This 
appeal is about just two things: whether Trusty v. Ray is still good law, and whether the terms 
"acceleration" and "maturity date" can be meaningfully decoupled from each other. Notably, 
Chase's brief avoids addressing the first of these issues - it fails to cite Trusty v. Ray at all and 
relies heavily on non-authoritative cases from outside the state ofldaho. 
This case is not about whether the entry of default was proper, or whether Chase was 
properly served, or whether on remand the district court should hold an evidentiary hearing. The 
only critical fact under the relevant statutes is that the debt secured by the deed of trust in this case 
was accelerated more than five years before CMJ filed to quiet title. Due to Chase's default at the 
district court, that fact cannot be disputed. This case calls for a straightforward application of the 
Idaho Code and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court should reverse the district court's 
order dismissing the case, remand with instructions to enter judgment or default judgment in 
CMJ's favor, and award CMJ costs and fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Chase's argument that the stated maturity date persisted despite acceleration ignores 
accepted definitions of key legal terms. 
Chase suggests that CMJ's proposed statutory construction is incorrect because it violates 
the "cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be given meaning." 
Resp't's Br. 7 (quoting Robbins v. Cnty. of Blaine, 134 Idaho 113, 120 (2000)). Chase then recites 
related rules of statutory construction that "a statute must be 'construed so that effect is given to 
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its provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant" and "the statute must be 
construed as a whole." Id. at 7-8 (quoting Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311,315 (1998)). Chase 
appears to take issue with CMJ' s intentional decision not to offer argument related to the last 
sentence of Idaho Code section 5-214A. That sentence provides that "[i]f the obligation or 
indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a maturity date, then the date of the accrual 
of the cause of action giving rise to the right to foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturity of 
such obligation or indebtedness." See IC.§ 5-214A. 
Here, the first page of the Credit Line clearly provides "Maturity Date: 08/09/2037." R. 
20, Comp!. Ex. B p. 1. The second page of the Deed of Trust clearly provides "the Debt is due and 
payable in full thirty (30) years from the date of this Deed of Trust which is 08/09/2037 (the 
"Maturity Date")." Therefore, the last sentence of section 5-214A is inapplicable in the present 
case because the condition it states ("[i]fthe obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage 
does not state a maturity date ... ") is not satisfied on these facts. That statutory sentence presumably 
exists to ensure that a lender cannot avoid the application of section 5-214A by failing to provide 
a maturity date as of a date certain. The sentence operates as a gap-filler to ensure that the section 
encompasses all mortgages. CMJ' s choice not to reference that sentence was not an oversight; the 
sentence simply has no application in this case. Because its condition is not met, omitting the 
sentence does not render it superfluous or insignificant. The statute is still construed as a whole 
and all of its parts are given meaning - some of the parts simply do not apply in this case. 
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2. CMJ is entitled to the relief sought in spite of Chase's arguments regarding the 
contractual language. 
a. Although the contract sets the initial maturity date, acceleration by definition 
changes the maturity date. 
Chase argues that "the actions of the parties cannot modify defined contractual terms." 
Resp't's Br. 9. This argument misunderstands the nature of the issues before the Court. It is true 
here that "maturity date" is a contractually-defined term. But that term is defined in part as the 
date "the Debt is due and payable in full." R. JO, Comp!. Ex. A p. 2. CMJ does not dispute that 
contracting parties can redefine commonly-used words as they see fit. But if a party truly intends 
to abrogate a well-understood definition, the common-use definition should be clearly disclaimed. 
In the documents at issue here, it is not at all clear that there was any meeting of the minds 
regarding redefining the col?monly-used term "maturity date." At best the definition of"maturity 
date" in the contract is ambiguous. "Ambiguities in a contract of adhesion should be construed 
against the drafter." Fannie Mae v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 702 (2015). "A contract of adhesion is 
an agreement between two parties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the language of a 
standardized contract, writt~n by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and offered 
to the weaker party on a 'take-it-or-leave-it basis."' Id Because Chase's predecessor-in-interest 
Washington Mutual drafted the adhesion contract here, any ambiguity should be resolved in CMJ's 
favor. More to the point, Chase's argument is merely a post-hoc attempt to avoid the natural 
consequence of the fact that "accelerate" and "maturity date" are tightly coupled terms that cannot 
meaningfully be separated. See Appellant's Br. 10-12. 
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Moreover, "maturity date" is a term used in the applicable statute. Regardless of how the 
contract defined or used the term, for purposes of applying section 5-214A the term must be given 
its "plain, obvious, and rational meaning." Hammer v. City of Sun Valley, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 418 
(Dec. 21, 2016) at *13 (c;iting Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478 (2002)). 
Unambiguous statutes are applied as written. Id "A statute is ambiguous where the language is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction .... If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be 
construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean .... To determine that intent, [courts] 
examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." Id at 13-15 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Notably absent from the list of how courts 
construe statutes is an evaluation of what the parties or their contract suggest a statutory term 
means. In any case, section.5-214A is not ambiguous. As detailed at length in CMJ's Appellant's 
Brief, "maturity date" is well-defined and well-understood to mean the actual date payment of a 
debt is due in full. The fact that the present maturity date differs from the original maturity date 
is a function of the acceleration clause - not the maturity date definition. As detailed in CMJ's 
Appellant's Brief, the acc~leration clause is meant to specifically change the maturity date -
otherwise what is it that is being accelerated? Here, the maturity date was accelerated to a point 
more than five (5) years prior to the filing of CMJ's quiet title claim. 
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b. Contract terms addressing waiver do not change the result. 
Chase insists that under the contract documents, CMJ waived the statute of limitations and 
Chase's decision to delay foreclosing does not result in a waiver of its right to do so. Resp't's Br. 
10-11. Neither of these arguments are applicable here. 
CMJ does not dispute that the Credit Line includes language purporting to waive the statute 
of limitations. However, that language is inapplicable to the matter at issue for several reasons. 
Statutes oflimitations procedurally operate as affirmative defenses, but CMJ is not a defendant in 
this action and therefore any purported waiver of a statute of limitations defense is not relevant. 
Moreover, the purported waiver of statute of limitations appears in the Credit Line but does not 
appear in the Deed of Trust. 1 To the extent any statute of limitations is relevant at all, it is only 
relevant with respect to the Deed of Trust and only for the purpose of evaluating whether the statute 
oflimitations for Chase to foreclose the Deed of Trust has lapsed, per Idaho Code section 45-1515 
and 5-214A. Any waiver of a statute oflimitations on the Credit Line has no impact on the statute 
of limitations to foreclose the Deed of Trust. Further, CMJ is not a party to the Credit Line and 
did not itself make any such waiver. The purported waiver was made by Cory Jakobson, not CMJ .2 
Finally, it is not clear under Idaho law that a statute of limitations may be waived prospectively. 
1 The language in the Credit Line provides: "You waive any statutes of limitations ... of this Agreement"; elsewhere 
the Credit Line defines "Agreement" as "This WaMu Mortgage Plus(TM) Agreement and Disclosure" without 
referencing the Deed of Trust. R. 20, Comp!. Ex. B p. 1. 
2 Of course, any statute of limitation issues became inapplicable after Cory Jakobson was granted a discharge in his 
bankruptcy case. 
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Although Idaho appellate courts have apparently not addressed this issue, it has been considered 
by other states and by legal scholars: 
According to Williston on Contracts, most jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue 
hold that such waivers are void: 
Although in certain states it has been held that a contract not to plead the 
statute oflimitations whenever made may be binding indefinitely, the great 
and substantial majority of jurisdictions hold that such a promise is 
definitely in contravention of the public policy of the statute and will not, 
in consequence, be enforced. 
When thus interpreted, that is, as a promise never to plead the statute it is 
immaterial when the promise is made, because, by the general rule, such a 
promise is illegal whether made before or after maturity of the debt. 
31 Williston on Contracts § 79: 110 ( 4th ed. 2004) (footnotes omitted); accord 3 
Corbin on Contracts § 9.9 (rev. ed. 1996) ("A promise not to plead the statute of 
limitations as a defense, or a promise to waive completely the benefit of it, are 
generally contrary to public policy particularly if made by contract in advance."); 
Haggerty v. Williams, 84 Conn. App. 675, 855 A.2d 264, 268 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2004) ("'[A] stipulation contained in a written instrument, waiving the defense of 
the statute oflimitations permanently, as to any breach of contract that might occur 
in the future, is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy."' (Quoting 
Hirt/er v. Hirt/er, 566 P.2d 1231, 1231 (Utah 1977)). 
As the Connecticut Court of Appeals noted, recognizing permanent waivers would 
lead to their routine insertion and ultimately eviscerate the statute of limitations. 
Haggerty, 855 A.2d at 269. This concern was expressed by the trial judge in his 
oral opinion: 
I think that [a perpetual waiver of limitations] would be [] against public 
policy. And I think there's a good reason for that. If you could perpetually 
waive the statute of limitations then every note would automatically have a 
clause in it with a perpetual waiver of the statute oflimitations and we'd be 
back where we started from. And I think that that is just simply not the law. 
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Ahmad v. Eastpines Terrace Apts., Inc., 200 Md. App. 362, 374-376 (2011). Thus, to the extent 
the purported waiver appears to operate prospectively, it should be deemed void and unenforceable 
as against public policy. 
Chase also quotes a section of the Credit Line providing that "[t]o the extent pennitted by 
law, we may delay or waive the enforcement of any of our rights under this Agreement without 
losing that right or any other right.. .. " R. 25, Comp!. Ex. B p. 6. The key part of this paragraph is 
the initial clause, "[t]o the extent permitted by law." The law, namely Idaho Code sections 45-
1515 and 5-214A, only permitted Chase to delay enforcing its right to foreclose for up to five years 
from the maturity date. An attempt to contractually agree that such a statute does not apply has no 
effect. Further, and once again, the reservation ofrights here applies to the Credit Line but not the 
Deed of Trust. It is the Deed of Trust that is more properly the subject of the instant action, and 
that document includes no such reservation of rights. Nor may the reservation in the Credit Line 
reasonably be read to apply to the Deed of Trust in light of the Credit Line's definition of 
"Agreement." 
c. Chase's public policy arguments fail and do not change the required result. 
Chase argues that CMJ's interpretation "underestimates [the] importance of the public 
notice requirements created by the maturity date contained in the loan documents." Resp't's Br. 
12-13. First, Idaho Code section 5-214A is not concerned with providing notice to unrelated third 
parties. Second, even ifthe·notice of the maturity date is important, the public also has notice that 
the maturity date may be accelerated upon certain events. Lastly, for loans such as this where no 
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payments have been made for a number of years, a maturity date of record does not provide a good 
indicator of quality of risk. Chase's purported public policy arguments are not availing. 
Chase next suggests that CMJ' s interpretation "seeks to undermine the statute by 
introducing a floating statute of limitations that is based entirely upon the actions of the parties, 
which will only serve to create confusion (and litigation) for courts, lenders, borrowers, and third 
parties." Resp 't 's Br. 13. This is a very broad statement. The proposition that acceleration 
changes the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run is a simple proposition that is 
consistent with the most natural reading of the statute. By contrast, Chase's suggestion to sever 
the enduring and well-understood relationship between acceleration and maturity is the 
interpretation that would add confusion and remove clarity. Further, "floating" statutes of 
limitation are common in any contract scenario - a breach of a contract may be cured, or there may 
be continuing breaches of a ·contract (thus constantly resetting a statute of limitations for breach of 
the contract). 
d. So long as the acceleration date occurred more than 5 years prior to CMJ's 
quiet title action, the specific acceleration date does not matter. 
Chase points out, correctly, that there are multiple events of default that CMJ could have 
argued accelerated the maturity date. Respt's Br. 13-14. Chase seems to take issue with the fact 
that CMJ did not argue that Jakobson's violation of the "Due on Sale" provision in the Deed of 
Trust accelerated the maturity date in 2007. Id. at 14. But this intentionally ignores that CMJ's 
allegations in its Complaint and its arguments on appeal clearly claim that acceleration occurred 
"no later than April 6, 2011." R. 7, Comp!. ,i 21; Appellant's Br. 7 (emphasis added). CMJ's 
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Complaint was filed on June 17, 2016. R. 4, Comp!. p. 1. Because Idaho Code section 5-214A 
requires foreclosure within five years, CMJ's burden was merely to prove that the statute began to 
run at any time prior to June 1 7, 2011. CMJ adequately alleged that the maturity date was changed 
no later than April 6, 2011, and Chase's failure to timely appear and answer requires this allegation 
to be admitted. Further, Chase's argument appears to further admit that acceleration occurred prior 
to required date - June 17, 2011. CMJ therefore met its burden. Nonetheless, CMJ agrees that it 
could have argued that acceleration occurred as early as 2007 when Jakobson transferred the 
property to CMJ. 
More importantly, Chase misconstrues CMJ's argument by suggesting that CMJ is 
representing that "any event of default serves to reset the maturity date for statute of limitation 
purposes." Resp 't 's Br. 14. This is not CMJ's argument. CMJ's argument is that any acceleration 
resets the maturity date, as it must based on both the common sense and legal definitions of those 
terms. Some loan documents provide for automatic acceleration on certain events of default by 
using mandatory language· such as "shall" rather than permissive language such as "at the 
Beneficiary's option." If lenders are concerned that automatic acceleration of a maturity date 
might limit their period to foreclose, then their loan documents should be written with permissive 
rather than mandatory language. Here, the "Due on Sale" provision in the Deed of Trust provides 
that " ... the entire Debt shall become immediately due and payable in full upon sale or other 
transfer of the Property." R. 11, Comp/. Ex. A p. 3 (emphasis added). Further, the Credit Line 
provides that, upon Chase's termination of the Credit Line (which actually occurred), "the entire 
outstanding balance of the Credit Line ... will be immediately due and payable without prior notice 
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.. and you agree to pay immediately such amount plus any other amounts due under this 
Agreement." R. 25, Comp!. Ex. B, p. 6 (emphasis added). Thus, both events of default identified 
by the parties (the Credit Line clause identified by CMJ, and the Due on Sale provision identified 
by Chase) required immediate acceleration of the maturity date. . 
3. The district court erred in failing to deem CMJ's factual allegations admitted in light 
of Chase's default. 
Chase makes several arguments regarding the district court's entry of default against 
Chase. As an initial matter, Chase's brief includes a section heading stating that "The Lower Court 
Properly Denied the Appellant's Application for Default." Resp 't 's Br. 15. Setting aside, for a 
moment, the merits of that position - this heading is factually incorrect. The district court here 
granted CMJ's motion for entry of default, but it denied CMJ's motion for entry of default 
judgment. It may be that Chase merely omitted the word ''judgment" from the end of its section 
heading. 
a. Chase's alleged deficiencies in the Complaint are a red herring. 
Chase argues that the district court correctly deemed the maturity date a question of law 
rather than fact. Resp 't 's Br. 16. Ultimately Chase concludes that "CMJ' s Complaint failed to 
state a legitimate cause of action because an acceleration is not a maturity date for statute of 
limitations purposes." Id. at 17. For the reasons outlined in CMJ's Appellant's Brief and 
elsewhere in this Reply Brief, while CMJ recognizes that maturity date and acceleration does not 
mean the same thing- acceleration and maturity date are inextricably linked and Chase's argument 
must fail. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 13 
A•J; Matter: 6652-008 
Next Chase argues that CMJ is not entitled to the reliefit seeks because its Complaint lacks 
foundation. Id Chase points to the record's lack of a deed conveying the subject real property to 
CMJ and lack of evidence that Jakobson stopped paying on the Credit Line. Id. at 17-18. This 
argument misunderstands Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b )( 6) and the effect of failing to deny 
' an allegation. Idaho's pleading requirements mandate that "[a] pleading that states a claim for 
relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief." JR.C.P. 8(a)(2). It is a long-standing principle that a claim for relief need not include 
or attach all of the evidence necessary to prove the allegations made; the purpose of a complaint 
is merely to "put[] the adverse party on notice of the claims brought against it." Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 843-844 (2010). The purpose is not to require a complaining party to 
disclose all evidence sufficient to prove its allegations; otherwise there would be no need for the 
discovery process. More importantly, requiring a party to provide all proof of its allegations with 
its initial pleadings would eviscerate our justice system by eliminating the concept of, or need for, 
a civil trial. Very few cases could ever be brought and sustained if such were the standard. 
In light of the applicable pleading standard, CMJ was under no duty to offer, in its 
Complaint or other initial pleadings, the evidence that Chase suggests was required. The very 
point of Rule 8(b)(6) is to· ensure that when a party fails to appear and properly deny factual 
allegations that those allegations are then deemed admitted. This case presents an opportunity to 
reaffirm and apply that rule in its straightforward and customary manner. Chase is attempting to 
use these arguments as a red herring to divert attention from the fact that it failed to respond to 
CMJ' s complaint. 
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b. Setting aside the entry of default is not a proper subject of this appeal, and 
should not be ordered. 
Chase further argues that if the Court agrees with CMJ, "the proper remedy is to set aside 
the entry of default and remand the case for further proceedings." Resp 't 's Br. 18. Chase suggests 
that procedural deficiencies with service and with the entry of default require that the entry of 
default be set aside. Id However, CMJ waived these issues by failing to cross-appeal. 
In Idaho, a timely notice of appeal or cross-appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
challenge a determination made by a lower court. Failure to timely file such a 
notice shall cause automatic dismissal of the issue on appeal." Miller v. Bd of 
Trustees, 132 Idaho 244,248, 970 P.2d 512, 516 (1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Though Hamilton's dependents seek to modify the decision below, they 
failed to file a necessary cross-appeal. 
Hamilton v. Alpha Servs., LLC, 158 Idaho 683, 693 (2015). Additionally, "a cross-appeal is 
required only when the respondent seeks to change or add to the relief afforded below, but not 
when it merely seeks to sustain a judgment for reasons presented at trial which were not relied 
upon by the trial judge but should have been." Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 993 
(1987). Here, Chase seeks to change the relief afforded below by setting aside the entry of default. 
But Chase failed to cross-appeal and so cannot raise that issue. Nor is the issue of the entry of 
default a "subsidiary issue fairly comprised" in the issues CMJ raised, so Chase cannot raise it via 
CMJ's appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4) or 35(b)(4). Accordingly, CMJ is entitled to 
have the Court refuse to consider Chase's arguments that the entry of default was improper or that 
Chase was improperly served. 
Notwithstanding Chase's failure to preserve those issues for appeal, neither issue should 
be granted by this Court. CMJ filed its Complaint and Summons on June 17, 2016, and an 
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Affidavit of Service on June 24, 2016. R. 2. There was no other case activity before CMJ filed its 
Motion for Entry of Default and Default Judgment against [Chase] on July 27, 2016, supported by 
an affidavit of counsel filed the same day. R. 2. Chase filed its first appearance in the case, a 
Notice of Appearance, and an Objection a week later, on August 3, 2016. R. 2. The district court 
signed the order for entry of default that same day ( August 3, 2016), but did not file it until August 
16, 2016, the same day it entered its order and judgment dismissing CMJ's claims. R. 2-3, 42. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a)(l) provides that "[w]hen a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is 
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the court must order entry of the party's default. If a party has 
appeared in the action, that party must be served with 3 days' written notice of the application for 
entry of default before default may be entered." IR. C.P. 55(a)(l). CMJ properly moved for entry 
of default after Chase failed to appear within its required time. CMJ was not obligated to provide 
three days' written notice of its application for entry of default to Chase because Chase had not 
appeared in the matter. In fact, CMJ was entitled to an entry of default the moment it filed its 
application; the Rule provides that under the proper circumstances, "the court must order entry of 
the party's default." (emphasis added). By coincidence, Chase happened to file its notice of 
appearance before the district court actually entered its default. CMJ was entitled to an entry of 
default even after Chase had appeared, because Chase's appearance occurred more than three days 
after CMJ's motion. That is, even if CMJ had served a three-day written notice on Chase on July 
27, 2016, the fact that Chase did not appear until a full seven days later means that CMJ still would 
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have been able to move for entry of default before Chase first appeared.3 Rule 55(a)(l) is a simple 
and straightforward rule that would be made much more complex if Chase's late-filed notice of 
appearance were allowed to reset the Rule's operation when default had already been requested. 
Indeed, allowing Chase to derail the entry of default on these facts might encourage future parties 
who have not timely appeared or defended to wait to file a notice of appearance strategically just 
to add confusion to the process. 
Chase also argues that it was improperly served. Resp't's Br. 20-21. However, Chase 
cites exclusively to federal law regarding service of process, without citing any Idaho authority. 
In addition to failing to properly preserve or raise this issue on cross-appeal, Chase has failed to 
make any argument based on Idaho law that service was improper. This alone is reason enough 
to reject Chase's contentions on this issue. Indeed, it is nearly the only basis on which this issue 
can be decided. The record fails to include the Affidavit of Service referenced in the docket; the 
only relevant record evidence appears in an affidavit filed by counsel for CMJ, affirming that "the 
Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. were served by a process server on June 21, 2016, with 
a Summons and Complaint in the above-entitled matter. See Affidavit of Service filed on or about 
June 24, 2016." R. 33, ~ 2. If Chase intended to challenge the entry of default on grounds of 
improper service, it should have cross-appealed to raise that issue. At the very least, it should have 
ensured that the Affidavit of Service was included in the clerk's record on appeal so that the Court 
could specifically consider that issue. Its failure to do either of things precludes the Court's 
3 Of course, CMJ was not obligated to serve such a notice because Chase had not yet appeared. 
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consideration of this issue. Of course, the fact that Chase ultimately did appear in this action at 
the district court means that regardless of how service was ultimately provided, Chase did get 
notice of the action in time to appear. 
Next, Chase asserts that the entry of default should be set aside because it is "incongruent" 
with the district court's order denying CMJ' s application for default judgment. Resp 't 's Br. 21. 
Chase does not support this assertion with argument. By the plain language of Rule 55(a)(l ), CMJ 
was entitled to an entry of default: "When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief 
is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, 
the court must order entry of the party's default." (emphasis added). There is no incongruency 
where an entry of default does not subsequently lead to an entry of default judgment and there is 
no basis here for setting aside the entry of default. 
Chase also argues that on remand, the district court should hold a hearing where CMJ 
would be required to prove its allegations with evidence. Resp 't 's Br. 21. This argument is based 
on the authority granted to the district court in Rule 55(b )(2) to "conduct hearings or make referrals 
when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to ... (C) establish the truth of any allegation by 
evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter." Here, there is simply no need for an evidentiary 
hearing. The factual allegations in CMJ' s Complaint must be deemed admitted under Rule 8(b )( 6). 
Further, Chase does not appear to reasonably dispute the factual allegations made in the Complaint. 
Even if the Court were to rule that the issue of the maturity date is a legal rather than a factual 
issue, the Court can and should resolve that question here, in this appeal. This matter should be 
resolved firmly and finally at this stage. 
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4. CMJ is entitled to. attorney fees on appeal. Additionally, even if the Court rules 
against CMJ, Chase is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
The parties' briefing for this appeal has occurred contemporaneously with the Idaho 
Legislature's reconsideration of the applicable standard to determine when attorney fees are 
appropriate under Idaho Code section 12-121. At the time of this writing, the Legislature has 
passed and the Governor has approved an updated version of section 12-121, effective March 1, 
2017, restoring the status quo prior to the Hoffer v. Shappard opinion. Accordingly, the applicable 
standard is whether "the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation." HB. No. 97. 
Chase offers circular logic to address CMJ's claim for attorney fees: "Chase asserts that it 
should prevail on this appeal, so it has not defended this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation." Resp't's Br. 23. If merely asserting that one should prevail were enough to 
avoid liability for attorney fees under section 12-121, then the statute would never be invoked 
because every litigant would make the same assertion. 
The Court should grant CMJ its requested relief on appeal, which would make it the 
prevailing party. The Court should further award CMJ attorney fees on appeal because Chase's 
primary argument on the key legal issue is that "acceleration" and "maturity date" are concepts 
that can be meaningfully distinguished and decoupled from each other. That is simply not so, and 
it is frivolous and unreasonable to suggest otherwise. Accordingly, CMJ is entitled to its attorney 
fees on appeal. 
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If the Court instead upholds the district court's order, CMJ should not be liable for Chase's 
attorney fees on appeal. Where an appellant brings a novel legal question to the Court, attorney 
fees should not be granted against the party under section 12-121. Campbell v. Kil dew, 141 Idaho 
640, 651 (2005). Here, CMJ raised novel issues of law with respect to Idaho Code sections 6-411 
and 6-413, where there is almost no jurisprudence. It also raised a novel legal issue in questioning 
the continuing viability of Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232 (1952). Inviting the Court to clarify the 
applicability of untested provisions ofldaho Code or of decades-old precedent is not frivolous and 
should not serve as a basis for an adverse award of attorney fees. Chase's request for attorney fees 
should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, CMJ respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district 
court's order dismissing the case, remand with instructions to enter judgment in CMJ's favor, and 
award CMJ costs and fees on appeal. 
DATED this 24th day of March, 2017. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
CMJ Properties, LLC 
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